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Abstract
In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions
it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance
with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality,
unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But
it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is
possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no
individual veto power, or extended unanimity preservation. We fully characterize
the agendas for which there are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient
open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on
earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (2002), Nehring (2006), Dietrich and List
(2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (2010a).
1 Introduction
Many democratically organized groups, such as electorates, legislatures, committees, ju-
ries and expert panels, are faced with the problem of judgment aggregation: They have
to make collective judgments on certain propositions on the basis of the group members’
individual judgments on them, for example on whether to pursue a particular policy
proposal, to hold a defendant guilty, or to ﬁnd that global warming poses a threat
of a certain magnitude. In such cases, it is natural to expect that the group’s judg-
ment on any proposition should be determined by the individual members’ judgments
on it. Call this the idea of propositionwise aggregation, or technically, independence.
This idea is naturally reﬂected in the way in which we normally make decisions in
committee meetings, conduct referenda or take votes on issues we want to adjudicate
collectively. Propositionwise aggregation can further be shown to be necessary for the
non-manipulability of the decision process, both by strategic voting (Dietrich and List
2007b, see also Nehring and Puppe 2002) and by strategic agenda setting (Dietrich
2006a, List 2004). Yet the recent literature on judgment aggregation demonstrates that
propositionwise aggregation is surprisingly hard to reconcile with the rationality of the
resulting group judgments. A sequence of by-now much-discussed results (beginning
∗Although the authors are jointly responsible for this paper, Christian List wishes to note that Franz
Dietrich should be considered the primary author, who deserves the credit for the present mathematical
proofs. We are grateful to Ben Polak, the anonymous referees, and an anonymous associate editor for
comments on this paper.
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with List and Pettit 2002, 2004) shows that, for many decision problems, only dictator-
ial or otherwise unattractive aggregation rules fulﬁl the requirement of propositionwise
aggregation while also ensuring rational group judgments (for a review, see below and
List and Puppe 2009; see also a 2010 symposium in JET ). The classic illustration of
what can go wrong is given by the discursive dilemma (Pettit 2001, building on Korn-
hauser and Sager 1986). If individual judgments are as shown in Table 1, for example,
majority voting, the paradigmatic case of a propositionwise aggregation rule, gener-
ates logically inconsistent group judgments. The results in the literature on judgment
aggregation have generalized this ﬁnding well beyond majority voting.
a a→ b b
Individual 1 True True True
Individual 2 True False False
Individual 3 False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: A discursive dilemma
While this clearly highlights the need to ﬁnd plausible aggregation rules that lift the
restriction of propositionwise aggregation (and the literature already contains some work
on this, as discussed at the end of this paper), there are still a number of open technical
questions on the classic, propositionwise case. The aim of this paper is to answer the
most salient such questions. We prove new results on the existence of propositionwise
aggregation rules which are non-oligarchic, anonymous, give no individual veto power,
or are extended-unanimity-preserving, as deﬁned below.
To give a brief overview of our results, it is helpful to review the most closely related
existing results. We begin by introducing the classic background conditions imposed
on propositionwise aggregation; formal deﬁnitions are given later. Call an aggregation
rule regular if it accepts as admissible input all combinations of fully rational individ-
ual judgments (universal domain) and produces as its output fully rational collective
judgments (collective rationality). Call it unanimity-preserving if, in the event that all
individuals hold the same judgments on all propositions, these judgments become the
collective ones. The case of regular, unanimity-preserving and propositionwise judg-
ment aggregation is interesting since it naturally generalizes Arrow’s famous conditions
on preference aggregation to the context of judgment aggregation (List and Pettit 2004,
Dietrich and List 2007a, Dokow and Holzman 2010a).
A much-cited result shows that, if (and only if) the decision problem under consid-
eration, called the agenda, has two combinatorial properties, as deﬁned below, the only
judgment aggregation rules satisfying these conditions are the dictatorships (Dokow and
Holzman 2010a; the ‘if’ part was independently obtained by Dietrich and List 2007a),
which can be shown to generalize Arrow’s classic theorem. This result, in turn, builds
on an earlier, seminal result on abstract aggregation by Nehring and Puppe (2002).1
Nehring and Puppe’s result requires the aggregation rule to satisfy the further condi-
1Nehring and Puppe’s results were originally formulated in the context of strategy-proof social choice
but are translatable into the frameworks of abstract aggregation as well as judgment aggregation in the
present, logic-based sense. For a statement of the results in an abstract aggregation framework, see
Nehring and Puppe (2010), which we also recommend to readers whenever we refer to their 2002 paper.
The relationship between the various frameworks is discussed in List and Puppe (2009).
2
tion of monotonicity, according to which a proposition’s collective acceptance is never
reversed by increased individual support, but applies to a larger class of agendas with
only one of the two combinatorial properties just mentioned. (Monotonicity, in turn,
can be motivated by its necessity for the non-manipulability or strategy-proofness of
the aggregation rule.2) Another pair of results addresses the case in which the aggre-
gation rule satisﬁes an additional neutrality condition, requiring equal treatment of all
propositions. The conjunction of propositionwise independence and neutrality is called
systematicity.3 Here Dietrich and List (2007a) characterize the class of agendas for
which only dictatorial aggregation rules are possible, while Nehring and Puppe’s earlier
paper (2002) provides the analogous characterization in the case in which monotonicity
is required as well. Nehring and Puppe (2005) and Nehring (2006) also characterize
the classes of agendas for which all regular, unanimity-preserving, propositionwise and
monotonic aggregation rules are (i) oligarchic, (ii) oligarchic but non-dictatorial, (iii)
give some individual veto power, (iv) violate anonymity, or (v) violate a requirement of
neutrality between propositions and their negations.
With the exception of case (v), however, the analogous results without requiring
monotonicity are not yet known (on case (v), see Dietrich and List 2010c). Although,
 
Conditions on 
an aggregation rule 
 
(in addition to regularity, unanimity 
preservation & prop'wise aggregation) 
 
Monotonicity 
not required 
Monotonicity 
required 
Non-dictatorship 
 
Totally blocked 
& even-number negatable 
 
(Dietrich & List 2007a (for sufficiency) 
and Dokow & Holzman 2010a)  
 
Totally blocked 
 
(Nehr ing & Puppe 2002) 
Non-dictatorship 
& neutrality between each 
proposition and its negation 
 
Non-simple 
& even-number negatable 
& non-separable 
 
(Dietrich & List 2010c) 
 
Non-simple 
& non-separable 
 
(Nehr ing & Puppe 2005) 
Non-dictatorship 
& neutrality 
 
Non-simple 
& even-number negatable 
 
(Dietr ich & List 2007a) 
 
 
Non-simple 
 
(Nehr ing & Puppe 2002) 
Non-oligarchy ? 
 
Semi-blocked 
& non-trivial 
 
(Nehring 2006) 
 
 
Anonymity 
 
? 
 
Blocked 
 
(Nehring & Puppe 200a2) 
 
No veto power ? 
 
Minimally blocked 
 
(Nehr ing & Puppe 2002) 
 
 
Extended unanimity 
preservation 
 
? ? 
 
Table 2: Classes of agendas generating an impossibility
2See Nehring and Puppe (2002) and Dietrich and List (2007b).
3This condition was introduced in List and Pettit’s (2002) original impossibility result.
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as noted, monotonicity can be motivated by the fact that it is a necessary condition
for non-manipulability or strategy-proofness, the case without the requirement, where
aggregation rules can but need not be monotonic, is nonetheless of interest. Historically,
monotonicity is neither part of the standard ‘package’ of Arrovian conditions, nor is it
included in the early impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation. Technically, a key
tool for the generation of characterization results, namely Nehring and Puppe’s so-called
‘intersection property’ (2002), is not available without requiring monotonicity, and thus
the proof of characterization results without this requirement presents an interesting
challenge.
Turning to another issue, distinct from monotonicity, a further condition called ex-
tended unanimity preservation, which is inspired by recent work on probabilistic opinion
pooling, has not yet been investigated in the context of judgment aggregation. Roughly
speaking, extended unanimity preservation requires that whenever any proposition p of
a certain kind is entailed by every individual’s judgment set, then it is also entailed by
the collective judgment set. This condition is strong, but of technical interest.
Table 2 summarizes what is and is not known about propositionwise aggregation.
The table leaves out some early notable non-characterization results (including List
and Pettit 2002, Pauly and van Hees 2006, Dietrich 2006a and Mongin 2008) and some
results on truth-functional agendas (e.g., Nehring and Puppe 2008, Dokow and Holzman
2009a). The headings of the rows and columns indicate the conditions imposed on the
aggregation rule, and the corresponding entries indicate the classes of agendas for which
the given conditions are impossible to satisfy. By implication, for all agendas without
the indicated properties, the conditions on the aggregation rule can be satisﬁed. The
family of blockedness conditions — properly deﬁned below — was ﬁrst introduced in a
related framework by Nehring and Puppe (2002).
The present paper ﬁlls the ﬁve blanks in Table 2, where there are still question
marks. In each case, we fully characterize the class of agendas for which the indicated
conditions lead to an impossibility, which, as noted, simultaneously characterizes the
class of agendas for which they can be met. We also obtain several subsidiary results.
Surprisingly, while in all previously studied cases — i.e., the three non-dictatorship cases
in Table 2 — the move from an impossibility result with the condition of monotonicity
to one without it has required the addition of a further condition on the agenda (even-
number negatability), all but one of our present results do not require this addition.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the formal model,
following List and Pettit (2002) and Dietrich (2007). In Section 3, we present our
results in answer to the question marks in Table 2, devoting one subsection to each
of our main results. Our last result (on extended unanimity preservation) covers two
question marks at once. In Section 4, we give an overview of the logical relationships
between the various classes of agendas, partially ordering them by inclusion, and draw
some general lessons from our ﬁndings. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a ﬁnite set of three or more individualsN = {1, ..., n} faced with a judgment
aggregation problem. The propositions on which judgments are made are represented in
a suitable language L. A simple example is given by propositional logic. Here L consists
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of some ‘atomic’ propositions a, b, c, ... and all ‘compound’ propositions constructible
from them using the connectives ¬ (‘not’), ∧ (‘and’), ∨ (‘or’), → (material ‘if-then’)
etc., such as a∧b, a∨b, (a∧b)→ c. Richer languages, which are often needed to express
realistic decision problems, may also include quantiﬁers (‘for all’ and ‘there exists’) or
non-truth-functional connectives (e.g., ‘it is possible that’, ‘it is necessary that’, ‘if _
were the case, then _ would be the case’).
Generally, a language L for our purposes is a set of sentences, called propositions,
that is endowed with a negation operator ¬ and a notion of consistency. Both are well-
behaved: The language is closed under negation (i.e., if p ∈ L, then ¬p ∈ L), and each
set of propositions S ⊆ L is either consistent or inconsistent (but not both), subject
to standard properties.4 We say that a set S ⊆ L entails a proposition p ∈ L, written
S ⊢ p, if S ∪ {¬p} is inconsistent.5
A decision problem is represented by the agenda of propositions under consideration,
deﬁned as a non-empty set
X = {p,¬p : p ∈ X+},
where X+ ⊆ L contains no propositions beginning with the negation operator ¬. In the
example of Table 1, the agenda is
X = {a,¬a, b,¬b, a→ b,¬(a→ b)}.
We assume that X is ﬁnite and that every proposition p ∈ X is contingent, i.e., {p} and
{¬p} are each consistent. We further assume that double negations cancel each other
out.6
A judgment set is a subset A ⊆ X of the agenda (‘A’ for set of ‘accepted’ proposi-
tions). It is called
• complete if it contains a member of each proposition-negation pair p,¬p ∈ X; and
• consistent if it is a consistent set in L.
LetU denote the set of all complete and consistent (‘fully rational’) judgment sets. A
proﬁle is an n-tuple (A1,...,An) of judgment sets across the individuals in N .
An aggregation rule is a function F that assigns to each proﬁle of individual judgment
sets (A1, ..., An) from some non-empty domain of admissible proﬁles a resulting collective
judgment set A = F (A1, ..., An) ⊆ X. We restrict our attention to regular aggregation
rules, deﬁned as functions F : Un → U, which accept all proﬁles of complete and
consistent individual judgment sets as admissible input (universal domain) and generate
complete and consistent collective judgment sets as output (collective rationality).
4Firstly, every proposition-negation pair {p,¬p} ⊆ L is inconsistent. Secondly, subsets of consistent
sets S ⊆ L are still consistent. Thirdly, the empty set ∅ is consistent, and every consistent set S ⊆ L
has a consistent superset T ⊆ L that contains a member of each proposition-negation pair {p,¬p} ⊆ L.
5Our model allows one to interpret consistency either semantically (as satisﬁability) or syntactically
(as non-derivability of a contradiction). Thus the derivative notion of entailment has either a semantic
or a syntactic interpretation. In the former case the symbol ‘’ is more common than our symbol ‘⊢’.
6To be precise, for any p ∈ X, where p belongs to the proposition-negation pair {q,¬q} ⊆ L (with
q ∈ X+), we write ‘¬p’ to refer to the other member of that pair. This ensures that ¬p is still in X.
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3 Results
As a background to our results, we ﬁrst recapitulate the analogue of Arrow’s theorem
in judgment aggregation. While the conditions of universal domain and collective ra-
tionality satisﬁed by a regular judgment aggregation rule are the analogues of Arrow’s
equally named conditions, Arrow’s conditions of independence of irrelevant alternatives,
the weak Pareto principle and non-dictatorship have the following three analogues.
Propositionwise independence. For all p ∈ X and all admissible proﬁles (A1, ..., An),
(A′1, ..., A
′
n), if p ∈ Ai ⇔ p ∈ A
′
i for all individuals i, then p ∈ F (A1, ..., An) ⇔
p ∈ F (A′1, ..., A
′
n).
Unanimity preservation. For all admissible unanimous proﬁles (A, ..., A), we have
F (A, ..., A) = A.
Non-dictatorship. There exists no individual i ∈ N (a dictator) such that
F (A1, ..., An) = Ai for every admissible proﬁle (A1, ..., An).
Aggregation rules satisfying these conditions are respectively called propositionwise,
unanimity-preserving and non-dictatorial. The regular judgment aggregation rules sat-
isfying all three conditions are precisely the analogues of preference aggregation rules
satisfying Arrow’s classic conditions, i.e., social welfare functions. For which decision
problems can we ﬁnd such rules?
While Arrow’s theorem tells us that in the case of preference aggregation there are
such rules if and only if there are at most two alternatives (and, by implication, none
once there are three or more alternatives), the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
the existence (or non-existence) of such rules in the case of judgment aggregation are
more complicated. To introduce these conditions, we must begin with some preliminary
terminology. We say that a proposition p ∈ X conditionally entails another proposition
q ∈ X, written p ⊢∗ q, if
{p} ∪ Y ⊢ q for some set Y ⊆ X consistent with p and with ¬q.
Further, for p, q ∈ X, we write p ⊢⊢∗ q if
there is a sequence of propositions p1,...,pk ∈ X such that p=p1 ⊢
∗ p2 ⊢
∗ ... ⊢∗ pk=q.
So ⊢⊢∗ is the transitive closure of ⊢∗.
Deﬁnition 1 An agenda X is totally blocked if, for all propositions p, q ∈ X, p ⊢⊢∗ q
(Nehring and Puppe 2002).
Total blockedness requires that any two propositions in X can be linked by a path
of conditional entailments. Accordingly, it is sometimes also called path-connectedness.
To deﬁne the next condition, call a set of propositions S ⊆ L minimal inconsistent if it
is inconsistent but all its subsets are consistent.
Deﬁnition 2 An agenda X is even-number negatable if there is a minimal inconsistent
set Y ⊆ X with a subset Z ⊆ Y of even size such that (Y \Z)∪{¬p : p ∈ Z} is consistent
(Dietrich 2007, Dietrich and List 2007a).
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This condition could also be stated by replacing ‘of even size’ with ‘of size two’, as
we note in the following remark.
Remark 1 An equivalent statement of even-number negatability is the following: There
is a minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X with distinct elements p, q ∈ Y such that
(Y \{p, q}) ∪ {¬p,¬q} is consistent.
Even-number negatability requires that the agenda include a minimal inconsistent
set that becomes consistent by negating some even number of its members (respectively,
some pair of its members). Even-number-negatability is equivalent to Dokow and Holz-
man’s (2010a) condition of non-aﬃneness, which requires that the set of admissible
{0, 1}-evaluations (‘truth-value assignments’) over the proposition-negation pairs in X
should not be an aﬃne subspace of {0, 1}
|X|
2 . The agenda of our introductory discursive-
dilemma example is even-number-negatable, but not totally blocked. By contrast, the
so-called preference agenda — consisting of all binary ranking propositions of the form
‘x is preferable to y’ over three or more distinct alternatives x, y, z, ... and subject
to the standard rationality constraints on preferences — is both even-number-negatable
(Dietrich and List 2007a, Dokow and Holzman 2010a) and totally blocked (Nehring
2003). We are now in a position to state the analogue of Arrow’s theorem.
Theorem 1 If the agenda is totally blocked and even-number negatable, there exists no
propositionwise, unanimity-preserving and non-dictatorial aggregation rule
F : Un → U. Otherwise there exist such rules.
In this form, Theorem 1 was proved by Dokow and Holzman (2010a); the impossi-
bility part was also proved by Dietrich and List (2007a). The result builds on an earlier
theorem by Nehring and Puppe (2002), in which the aggregation rule is required to sat-
isfy the additional condition ofmonotonicity, while the agenda condition of even-number
negatability is not needed. Unlike Arrow’s theorem, which shows that preference aggre-
gation in accordance with Arrow’s conditions is impossible for all but the most trivial
decision problems (namely for all except binary decisions), its analogue in the case of
judgment aggregation implies a signiﬁcant possibility. After all, the conjunction of total
blockedness and even-number negatability is quite demanding and violated by many
decision problems discussed in the literature on judgment aggregation, including, as
noted, the example of Table 1. However, the condition of non-dictatorship is arguably
too weak to guarantee fully ‘democratic’ judgment aggregation in the ordinary sense
of the term. In what follows, we consider three ways of strengthening the requirement
of non-dictatorship — namely non-oligarchy, anonymity and no individual veto power —
and ﬁnally one strengthening of unanimity preservation — namely extended unanimity
preservation, thereby addressing all the question marks in Table 2.
3.1 Non-oligarchic aggregation
To introduce the condition of non-oligarchy, call an aggregation rule F oligarchic if there
is a non-empty set M ⊆ N (of oligarchs) and a judgment set D ∈ U (the default) such
that, for all p ∈ X and all admissible proﬁles (A1, ..., An),
p ∈ F (A1, ..., An)⇔

p ∈ Ai for all oligarchs i ∈M if p ∈ X\D
p ∈ Ai for some oligarch i ∈M if p ∈ D.
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Under this notion of an oligarchy, ﬁrst deﬁned by Nehring and Puppe (2008), a group
of oligarchs has the power to determine the overall collective judgment on any given
proposition p whenever they are unanimous on p and to force the group to revert to a
default judgment on p whenever they disagree.7 A dictatorship is the special case in
which the set of oligarchs is singleton.
It is now reasonable to ask for which agendas we can ﬁnd aggregation rules satisfying
the previous conditions with non-dictatorship strengthened as follows.
Non-oligarchy. The aggregation rule F is not oligarchic.
Deﬁnition 3 An agenda X is semi-blocked if, for all propositions p, q ∈ X,
[p ⊢⊢∗ q and q ⊢⊢∗ p] or [p ⊢⊢∗ ¬q and ¬q ⊢⊢∗ p] (Nehring 2006).
An example of an agenda satisfying this condition is the one in our introductory
illustration of the discursive dilemma, i.e., X = {a,¬a, b,¬b, a→ b,¬(a→ b)}.8 To give
just one example of the relevant conditional entailments within that agenda, notice that
a ⊢⊢∗ ¬b (since a ⊢∗ ¬(a → b) with Y = {¬b} and ¬(a → b) ⊢∗ ¬b with Y = ∅) and
¬b ⊢⊢∗ a (since ¬b ⊢∗ ¬(a → b) with Y = {a} and ¬(a → b) ⊢∗ a with Y = ∅). The
following theorem applies.
Theorem 2 If the agenda is semi-blocked and even-number negatable, there exists no
propositionwise, unanimity-preserving and non-oligarchic aggregation rule F : Un →U.
Otherwise there exist such rules.
This theorem continues to hold if we impose the additional condition of monotonicity
on the aggregation rule while weakening even-number negatability to the condition
that the agenda is non-trivial (where an agenda is called trivial if it contains only a
single proposition-negation pair up to logical equivalence between propositions). This
monotonic variant was proved by Nehring (2006).9 Note that the move from Nehring’s
result with the condition of monotonicity to the present result without it parallels the
move from the existing non-dictatorship results with monotonicity to those without it
(recall the three non-dictatorship cases in Table 2). In each of these cases, even-number
negatability is essentially substituted for monotonicity.
Interestingly, however, the following corollary, as well as all of our subsequent results,
do not require the agenda condition of even-number negatability despite not imposing
monotonicity. This shows that the central move by which previous impossibility re-
sults without monotonicity have been obtained, namely the substitution of even-number
negatability for monotonicity (familiar from Dokow and Holzman’s and Dietrich and
List’s works), does not generalize to other salient cases.
7Another notion of oligarchy, discussed in Gärdenfors (2006), Dietrich and List (2008) and Dokow
and Holzman (forthcoming-b), deﬁnes F (A1, ..., An) as ∩i∈MAi, without any default judgments. An
oligarchy in this sense typically generates incomplete collective judgments, whereas the one discussed
in the present paper guarantees completeness.
8The claim that this agenda is semi-blocked requires that the connective → be interpreted as the
material conditional, as in standard propositional logic. There are other, arguably more realistic inter-
pretations of → under which the agenda is not semi-blocked. Thus our example can illustrate both the
impossibility and the possibility part of the following theorem, depending on the interpretation of →.
9The non-triviality condition is omitted in Nehring’s statement of the result.
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The announced corollary concerns the case in which non-dictatorship can be achieved
but non-oligarchy cannot. The corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorems 1
and 2, together with the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Every non-trivial agenda that is semi- but not totally blocked is even-number
negatable.
Corollary 1 All propositionwise and unanimity-preserving aggregation rules
F : Un → U are oligarchic but not all are dictatorial if and only if the agenda is
semi- but not totally blocked and non-trivial.
An instance of an agenda that is semi- but not totally blocked is of course the one in
our discursive-dilemma example. The corollary remains true if monotonicity is imposed
as an additional condition on the aggregation rule.
3.2 Anonymous aggregation
The next condition to be investigated is anonymity, the requirement of equal treatment
of all individuals.
Anonymity. For all admissible proﬁles (A1, ..., An), (A
′
1, ..., A
′
n) which are permutations
of each other, F (A1, ..., An) = F (A
′
1, ..., A
′
n).
For which agendas can we ﬁnd anonymous propositionwise aggregation rules?
Deﬁnition 4 An agenda X is blocked if it contains a proposition p ∈ X such that
p ⊢⊢∗ ¬p and ¬p ⊢⊢∗ p (Nehring and Puppe 2002).
An example of an agenda that is blocked (but neither totally nor semi-blocked) is
the one consisting of a, a ∧ b, a ∧ ¬b, a ∧ c and their negations. It is easy to verify
that a ⊢⊢∗ ¬a and ¬a ⊢⊢∗ a (but there is no conditional entailment from any other
proposition to a∧c). The following theorem holds. Notice that, as in Corollary 1 above,
the agenda condition of even-number negatability is not required, despite the absence
of monotonicity.
Theorem 3 Let n be even. If the agenda is blocked, there exists no propositionwise,
unanimity-perserving and anonymous aggregation rule F : Un → U; otherwise there
exist such rules.
The agenda in our introductory example can be used to illustrate the possibility
part of this theorem, since it is not blocked; we can never ﬁnd a sequence of conditional
entailments from a proposition to its negation. Here a propositionwise, unanimity-
preserving and anonymous aggregation rule is given by accepting a collectively if and
only if it is accepted by all individuals and accepting each of a → b and b collectively
if and only if it is accepted by at least one individual. Consistently with Theorem 2
above, this is an oligarchy with default D = {¬a, a→ b, b}.
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Theorem 3 remains valid if we add monotonicity as a condition on F . For an
odd group size n, the agenda condition for the impossibility is not blockedness but a
stronger and very complex condition; we spare the reader with the details. The result
with monotonicity added, for both even and odd n, was proved by Nehring and Puppe
(2002). Jointly with their result for odd n, we obtain the following corollary, which
drops monotonicity from Nehring and Puppe’s analogous result.
Corollary 2 There exist propositionwise, unanimity-perserving and anonymous aggre-
gation rules F : Un →U for all group sizes n if and only if the agenda is not blocked.
3.3 Aggregation without veto power
Note that oligarchic aggregation rules have the special property that all oligarchs have
the power to veto (i.e., prevent) any collective judgment set other than the default one.
Even anonymous aggregation rules do not automatically avoid the presence of such veto
power: In fact, they may give veto power to every individual. Just consider the case of
anonymous oligarchic rules, in which every individual is an oligarch. These observations
suggest that it may be democratically appealing to require the absence of individual veto
power.
No individual veto power. For all admissible proﬁles (A1, ..., An) in which n − 1
individual judgment sets coincide, i.e., they are all equal to A, we have F (A1, ..., An)=A.
Informally, the condition of no individual veto power requires that no singleton or
empty coalition can ever veto any judgment set. This simultaneously strengthens non-
oligarchy (and thereby also non-dictatorship) and unanimity preservation. For which
agendas can this condition be met? Unfortunately, the answer is that, for small group
sizes, it can never be met, while, for suﬃciently large group sizes, it can be met only
for rather special agendas.
Deﬁnition 5 An agenda X is minimally blocked if it contains at least two non-equivalent
propositions p, q ∈ X such that p ⊢⊢∗ q and q ⊢⊢∗ p (Nehring and Puppe 2002).
As in the case of semi-blockedness, the agenda in our introductory discursive-dilemma
example is also minimally blocked.10 Again, we can obtain a general result without re-
quiring the agenda to meet any additional conditions such as even-number negatability.
An interesting feature of that result, unlike previous results, is the occurrence of bounds
on the group size.
Theorem 4 If the agenda is minimally blocked, there exists no propositionwise aggre-
gation rule F : Un →U without individual veto power. Otherwise there exist such rules
if n ≥ 2
|X|
2
−1 (‘large groups’) and no such rules if n ≤ kX , where kX is the size of the
largest minimal inconsistent subset of X (‘small groups’).
10Again this requires a material interpretation of →. If, on the other hand, we interpret → as a strict
conditional (roughly speaking, a → b if and only if a ⊢ b), the agenda in the example is not minimally
blocked and hence falls under the possibility part of the next theorem.
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The theorem continues to hold if we impose the additional conditions of anonymity,
monotonicity or unanimity preservation on F (the last condition already follows from
no individual veto power). Are the bounds on the group size n in Theorem 4 tight or do
the stated (im)possibilities hold even under weaker bounds? The following observation,
proved in the Appendix, reinforces the limited possibility of propositionwise judgment
aggregation without individual veto power.
Remark 2 (a) The upper bound kX is tight: For every k > 1, some agendas X with
kX=k lead to possibility for each group size n>kX . (b) Any possible replacement of the
lower bound 2
|X|
2
−1 (as a function of |X|) grows exponentially in the agenda size |X|.
We can also simplify Theorem 4 in a way that requires no reference to any bounds.
Corollary 3 There exist propositionwise aggregation rules F : Un → U without indi-
vidual veto power for all suﬃciently large group sizes n if and only if the agenda is not
minimally blocked.
Like the theorem, this corollary remains true if anonymity, monotonicity or unanim-
ity preservation are added as conditions on F . With the last two additions, the corollary
yields Nehring and Puppe’s result on aggregation without individual veto power (2002).
Nehring and Puppe state their result as an equivalence between an aggregation possibil-
ity and the agenda condition of non-minimal-blockedness. The aggregation possibility
must be read as holding for suﬃciently large n, since the proof requires suﬃciently large
n. Small n implies impossibility by Theorem 4.
3.4 Extended-unanimity-preserving aggregation
The conditions investigated so far — non-oligarchy, anonymity and no individual veto
power — all strengthen the original condition of non-dictatorship. We have noted that
the condition of no individual veto power strengthens unanimity preservation as well.
We now turn to a condition that strengthens unanimity preservation alone, against the
background of regular propositionwise aggregation. The condition is inspired by recent
work on probabilistic opinion pooling (Dietrich and List 2007c).
Extended unanimity preservation. For all p ∈ L and all admissible proﬁles
(A1, ..., An), if for every individual i, Ai entails p, then F (A1, ..., An) entails p.
While, under propositionwise aggregation, the standard condition of unanimity
preservation requires that whenever a proposition p is contained in every individual’s
judgment set, it should also be contained in the collective one, extended unanimity-
preservation extends this requirement to propositions entailed by the judgment sets in
question. Since those propositions need not be included in the agenda, extended una-
nimity preservation can be seen as a requirement of unanimity preservation that goes
beyond the agenda.
In fact, the theorem to be stated does not require extended unanimity preservation
in its full form, i.e., quantifying over all propositions p ∈ L, but only in a restricted
form. It is suﬃcient to quantify over either (i) all pairwise disjunctions of propositions
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on the agenda (i.e., all p∨ q with p, q ∈ X), or equivalently (ii) all negations of pairwise
conjunctions of propositions on the agenda (i.e., all ¬(p ∧ q) with p, q ∈ X), or equiva-
lently (iii) all material implications between propositions on the agenda (i.e., all p→ q
with p, q ∈ X, where → is the material conditional).11 These conditions can also be
stated as follows:
Extended unanimity preservation for disjunctions. For all p, q ∈ X and all
admissible proﬁles (A1, ..., An), if, for every individual i, Ai contains p or q (or both),
then so does F (A1, ..., An).
Extended unanimity preservation for negated conjunctions. For all p, q ∈ X
and all admissible proﬁles (A1, ..., An), if, for every individual i, Ai does not contain
both p and q, then neither does F (A1, ..., An).
Extended unanimity preservation for material implications. For all p, q ∈ X
and all admissible proﬁles (A1, ..., An), if, for every individual i, p ∈ Ai ⇒ q ∈ Ai, then
p ∈ F (A1, ..., An)⇒ q ∈ F (A1, ..., An).
Each of these three conditions becomes equivalent to the standard condition of
unanimity preservation (assuming propositionwise aggregation) if the agenda happens
to be closed under either disjunction, or conjunction, or material implication.
It turns out that, if we rule out dictatorships, extended-unanimity-preserving propo-
sitionwise aggregation is possible only for an extremely restrictive class of agendas: the
‘simple’ ones.12
Deﬁnition 6 An agenda X is non-simple if it has at least one minimal inconsistent
subset of size greater than two (in short, if kX > 2).
Once more, the agenda of our initial example meets this condition; a minimal incon-
sistent subset of size three is X = {a, a→ b,¬b}. In fact, every agenda in which logical
interconnections extend beyond pairs of propositions is non-simple.
Theorem 5 If the agenda is non-simple, there exists no propositionwise, extended-
unanimity-preserving (for disjunctions, or negated conjunctions, or material implica-
tions) and non-dictatorial aggregation rule F : Un → U. Otherwise there exist such
rules.
As this result shows, by strengthening unanimity preservation in the present way, we
obtain an impossibility result that holds for most agendas — indeed, for all the agendas
used in discursive-dilemma examples in the literature. Once again, the result requires
no even-number negation condition on the agenda, despite not requiring monotonicity,
but remains true if we add monotonicity as a condition on the aggregation rule. Thus
Theorem 5 addresses the last two question marks in Table 2 above.
Interestingly, in the case of probabilistic opinion pooling, the directly analogous
conditions on an aggregation rule (propositionwise independence, extended unanimity
11This assumes that the relevant connectives (∨,∧,→) are part of the language L.
12 In Nehring and Puppe’s (2002) framework, simple agendas correspond to the ‘median spaces’.
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preservation for material implications and regularity) yield a characterization of linear
averaging on the class of non-simple agendas (Dietrich and List 2007c), whereas in the
present case of binary judgment aggregation, only degenerate such rules remain, namely
dictatorial ones, which give zero weight to all except one individual. This suggests that
the present impossibility need not be attributed exclusively to the demandingness of
extended unanimity preservation (which is, after all, satisﬁed by a common class of
aggregation rules in the probabilistic case), but can also be attributed, in part, to the
informational limitations of binary judgments.13
4 Conclusion
We hope to have addressed the most salient open technical questions concerning propo-
sitionwise aggregation. Our starting point has been the baseline case of propositionwise
judgment aggregation in accordance with Arrow-inspired conditions. We have charac-
terized the classes of agendas for which propositionwise judgment aggregation is possible
under various strengthenings of these conditions, requiring, respectively, non-oligarchy,
anonymity, no individual veto power and extended unanimity preservation. Table 3
summarizes our results. By superimposing Table 3 upon Table 2 above, we are able to
 
Conditions on 
an aggregation rule 
 
(in addition to regularity, unanimity 
preservation & prop'wise aggregation) 
 
Monotonicity 
not required 
Monotonicity 
required 
Non-oligarchy Semi-blocked & even-number negatable 
 
(see above) 
 
 
Anonymity 
 
 
Blocked 
 
No veto power 
 
Minimally blocked 
 
 
Extended unanimity 
preservation 
 
Non-simple 
 
Table 3: Classes of agendas generating an impossibility (summary of our results)
ﬁll all the gaps in the earlier table. Note that in the last three rows our results subsume
the cases with and without requiring monotonicity. Here, unlike in previous results in
the literature, monotonicity makes no diﬀerence. Contrary to what one might have ex-
pected based on previous work, then, the substitution of even-number negatability for
monotonicity is not the universal recipe for obtaining agenda characterization results
without requiring monotonicity. In some cases, the move from a result with the require-
ment of monotonicity to one without it necessitates the introduction of the additional
agenda condition of even-number negatability; in other cases it does not, as our present
results show.
13 In the probabilistic case, extended unanimity preservation (for disjunctions, negated conjunctions
or material implications) is equivalent to conditional zero-preservation, the requirement that, for any
p, q ∈ X , if all individuals unanimously assign a conditional probability of 0 to p given q, this assignment
should be preserved collectively.
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Given the large number of agenda conditions occurring in the literature on judg-
ment aggregation and the present paper, as summarized in Tables 2 and 3, it is useful
to clarify the logical relationships between the various conditions diagrammatically.
Figure 1 partially orders these conditions and the resulting classes of agendas by inclu-
Figure 1: Logical relationships between diﬀerent agenda conditions
sion. The strongest (most restrictive) condition is at the bottom, the weakest (most
permissive) at the top.
What general lessons can we learn from the present results? It is clear that, with
increasing strength of the conditions imposed on propositionwise aggregation, we are
faced with increasingly general impossibility results, and the classes of agendas for which
there remain possibilities become more and more restrictive. Given that genuinely ‘de-
mocratic’ judgment aggregation requires more than non-dictatorship alone, it is fair to
conclude that, for many real-world decision problems, classic, propositionwise aggrega-
tion is not democratically feasible. This leaves us with three main solutions. We can
either (i) relax some of the other Arrow-inspired conditions, notably universal domain
and collective rationality, or (ii) search for alternatives to propositionwise aggregation,
or (iii) move from binary judgments to more general propositional attitudes, such as
non-binary or probabilistic ones, as already mentioned brieﬂy above.
Relaxations of universal domain have been investigated by List (2003), Dietrich and
List (2010a) and Pivato (2009), relaxations of collective rationality by several contri-
butions, including List and Pettit (2002), Dietrich and List (2007d, 2008, forthcom-
ing), Gärdenfors (2006) and Dokow and Holzman (2010b). The literature also contains
some work on aggregation rules that drop the restriction of propositionwise aggregation.
Among the proposals investigated are the ‘premise-based’ aggregation rules (Pettit 2001,
List and Pettit 2002, Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006, Dietrich 2006a, Mongin 2008, Di-
etrich and Mongin 2010, building also on Kornhauser and Sager 1986), the ‘sequential
priority’ rules (List 2004, Dietrich 2006b) and the ‘distance-based’ rules (Pigozzi 2006,
Miller and Osherson 2009, building also on Konieczny and Pino-Perez 2002). Finally,
extensions of the model of judgment aggregation to more general propositional atti-
tudes, such as non-binary or probabilistic ones, have been oﬀered by Dietrich and List
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(2007c, 2010b) and Dokow and Holzman (2009b), building also on earlier work on ab-
stract aggregation (Rubinstein and Fishburn 1986) and probability aggregation (e.g.,
Genest and Zidek 1986).
Arguably, the further exploration of non-propositionwise aggregation and the sys-
tematic study of more general propositional attitudes are the biggest future challenges
in the theory of judgment aggregation. We hope that, by settling the most salient
open questions on classic propositionwise aggregation, the present paper inspires the
literature to move on to these new challenges.
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A Appendix: proofs
General notation. For all Z ⊆ Y (⊆ X) we write Y¬Z := (Y \Z) ∪ {¬z : z ∈ Z}.
Let ≡ be the (equivalence) relation on X deﬁned by p ≡ q ⇔ [p ⊢⊢∗ q and q ⊢⊢∗ p].
Whenever we consider an aggregation rule F , we denote by CFp or simply Cp the set of
coalitions C ⊆ N that are winning for p (∈ X), i.e., for which p ∈ F (A1, ..., An) for
all admissible proﬁles (A1, ..., An) with {i : p ∈ Ai} = C. (If F is propositionwise, it is
uniquely determined by its family of winning coalitions (Cp)p∈X ; if F is also unanimity-
preserving resp. monotonic, each set Cp contains N resp. is closed under enlarging
coalitions.)
Proof of Remark 1. We write EN for the agenda condition of even-number negata-
bility, and ENk for its variant in which ‘of even size’ is replaced by ‘of size k’. We have
to show that EN is equivalent to EN2.
Clearly, EN2 implies EN. Now suppose EN2 is false. We have to show that EN is
false, i.e., that all of EN2, EN4, EN6, and so on, are false. We proceed by induction.
(Closely related arguments are made by Dokow and Holzman 2010a.)
First, EN2 is false by assumption. Now suppose that EN2, EN4, ..., EN2k are all false
(for a given k ∈ {1, 2, ...}). To show that EN2(k+1) is also false, consider any minimal
inconsistent set Y ⊆ X and any subset Z ⊆ Y of size 2(k + 1). Obviously, Z can be
written as Z = Z′ ∪ {p, q} for a set Z ′ ⊆ Z of size 2k and p, q ∈ Z.
Claim 1. Y¬{p,q} is minimal inconsistent.
As EN2 is false, Y¬{p,q} is inconsistent, so has a minimal inconsistent subset W ;
we have to show that W = Y¬{p,q}. W contains ¬p as otherwise W is included in
the (consistent) set Y¬{q}. Analogously, W contains ¬q. So we may write W = W
′ ∪
{¬p,¬q} for some W ′ ⊆ Y \{p, q}. As EN2 is false, the set W
′ ∪ {p, q} (=W¬{¬p,¬q}) is
inconsistent. So, as W ′ ∪ {p, q} is included in the minimal inconsistent set Y , we have
W ′ ∪ {p, q} = Y . Hence, W = Y¬{p,q}.
Claim 2. Y¬Z is inconsistent. (This completes the proof.)
We have Y¬Z = (Y¬{p,q})¬Z′ . This set is inconsistent because EN2k is false and
because Y¬{p,q} is minimal inconsistent (by Claim 1) and Z
′ has size 2k. 
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A.1 Proof of Theorem 2 on non-oligarchic aggregation
To proof begins with two lemmas (the ﬁrst of which is known14), in addition to Lemma
1 stated in the main text.
Lemma 2 If the aggregation rule F : Un → U is propositionwise and unanimity-
preserving, then p ⊢∗ q ⇒ Cp ⊆ Cq for all p, q ∈ X.
Proof. Although known, we recall the simple argument. For F as speciﬁed, consider
p, q ∈ X with p ⊢∗ q. Let C ∈ Cp. By p ⊢∗ q there is Y ⊆ X such that Y ∪ {p,¬q}
is inconsistent but Y ∪{p} and Y ∪ {¬q} are consistent. It follows that Y ∪ {p, q}
and Y ∪ {¬p,¬q} are consistent. So, there is an (A1, ..., An) ∈ Un such that each Ai,
i ∈ C, includes Y ∪{p, q} and each Ai, i ∈ C, includes Y ∪{¬p,¬q}. Now F (A1, ..., An)
contains p (by C ∈ Cp) and all y ∈ Y (by N ∈ Cy), hence it contains q (by {p} ∪ Y ⊢ q
and F (A1, ..., An) ∈ U). So, C ∈ Cq as F is propositionwise. 
Lemma 3 Every even-number negatable agenda is non-trivial.
Proof. Let X be even-number negatable. Then there exists a minimal inconsistent
Y ⊆ X such that Y¬Z is consistent for an even-sized Z ⊆ Y . So there are distinct
p, q ∈ Z. Now X is non-trivial because p is not logically equivalent to q (otherwise Y
would remain inconsistent after removing q) and not logically equivalent to ¬q (otherwise
{¬p,¬q} would be inconsistent, violating the consistency of Y¬Z). 
Proof of Lemma 1. Let X be non-trivial, semi-blocked and not totally blocked. As
≡ is an equivalence relation, X is partitioned into equivalence classes. By assumption
on X,
(i) there are exactly two ≡-equivalence classes, each containing exactly one member
of each pair p,¬p ∈ X.
Moreover,
(ii) there is a minimal inconsistent Y ⊆ X such that |Y | ≥ 3,
since otherwise every conditional entailment in X is in fact an unconditional en-
tailment, so that each ≡-equivalence class consists of logically equivalent propositions,
which by (i) implies that X is trivial, a contradiction. Further, one of the two ≡-
equivalence classes in (i) satisﬁes p ⊢∗ q for all p in this class and all q in the other class,
since otherwise p ≡ q for p and q from diﬀerent classes; hence,
(iii) some ≡-equivalence class shares at most one element with each minimal incon-
sistent set Y ⊆ X.
The simple properties (i)-(iii) allow us to prove a key fact:
(iv) for every minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X, Y¬Z is consistent for each non-empty
subset Z ⊆ Y of pairwise ≡-equivalent propositions.
To show this, let Y and and Z be as in (iv). If Z is singleton, Y¬Z is obviously
consistent (by Y ’s minimal inconsistency). Now let |Z| ≥ 2. Suppose for a contradiction
that Y¬Z is inconsistent. Let Y
′ be a minimal inconsistent subset of Y¬Z . Let V be the
14See Dietrich and List (2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (forthcoming), and earlier Nehring and
Puppe (2002), who also assume monotonicity.
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≡-equivalence class with Z ⊆ V , and W the other ≡-equivalence class. By |Y ∩ V | ≥ 2
and (iii), |Y ′ ∩W | ≤ 1. So |Y ′ ∩ {¬z : z ∈ Z}| ≤ 1 (as {¬z : z ∈ Z} ⊆ W by (i)). So
Y ′ ⊆ (Y \Z) ∪ {¬z} for some z ∈ Z. But (Y \Z) ∪ {¬z} is consistent (by Y ’s minimal
inconsistency). So Y ′ is consistent, a contradiction.
To complete the proof, let Y be as in (ii). By |Y | ≥ 3 and (i), Y contains two
distinct ≡-equivalent p, q. So, by (iv), even-number negatability holds with this Y and
with Z := {p, q}. 
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove each direction of the implication.
1. First, suppose the agenda X is semi-blocked and even-number negatable. Let F :
U
n →U be propositionwise and unanimity-preserving. We show that F is oligarchic.
Case 1: X is totally blocked. Then F is dictatorial (hence oligarchic) by Theorem
1.
Case 2: X is not totally blocked. So, as X is also non-trivial by Lemma 3, the
assumptions of Lemma 1 are satisﬁed. Hence X has the properties (i)-(iv) shown in
the proof of Lemma 1; we shall use some of these properties. Let W ⊆ X be the ≡-
equivalence class in (iii), and V := X\W the only other ≡-equivalence class (by (i)).
Now
(v) there is a minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X with |Y | ≥ 3 such that |Y ∩W | = 1.
Suppose the contrary. Then Y ∩W = ∅ only for minimal inconsistent sets Y ⊆ Y
of size 2. So every conditional entailment p ⊢∗ q with p ∈ W satisﬁes p ⊢ q and
q ∈ W (the latter since otherwise ¬q ∈ W , implying |W ∩ {p,¬q}| = 2). Hence the
members of W are connected by paths of unconditional entailments, so are pairwise
logically equivalent. So V = X\W (= {¬w : w ∈W}) also consists of pairwise logically
equivalent propositions. Hence X is trivial, a contradiction by Lemma 2.
Let Y be as in (v). Let w be the element in Y ∩W , and v, v′ two distinct elements
in Y ∩ V . By Lemma 2, the set of coalitions Cp is the same for all p ∈ V ; call it C. We
now prove a ﬁrst closure-property of C:
(vi) C,C ′ ∈ C ⇒ C ∩C′ ∈ C (intersection-closedness).
Let C,C ′ ∈ C. Each of the sets Y¬{w}, Y¬{v′}, Y¬{v} and Y¬{v,v′} is consistent (the
ﬁrst three by Y ’s minimal inconsistency, the fourth by (iv)). So, there is a proﬁle
(A1, ..., An) ∈ U
n such that
• Y¬{w} ⊆ Ai for all i ∈ C ∩C
′,
• Y¬{v′} ⊆ Ai for all i ∈ C\C
′,
• Y¬{v} ⊆ Ai for all i ∈ C
′\C,
• Y¬{v,v′} ⊆ Ai for all i ∈ N\(C ∪C
′).
Now F (A1, ..., An) contains v since C ∈ C and v ∈ V , contains v
′ since C′ ∈ C
and v′ ∈ V , and contains all y ∈ Y \{v, v′, w} by unanimity preservation. In summary,
Y \{w} ⊆ F (A1, ..., An). So, as Y \{w} ⊢ ¬w, F (A1, ..., An) contains ¬w. Hence C∩C
′ ∈
C¬w, i.e., C ∩C ′ ∈ C (as ¬w ∈ V by w ∈W ), as required.
Next, we prove a second closure property of C:
(vii) C ∈ C&C ⊆ C′ ⊆ N ⇒ C′ ∈ C (superset-closedness).
Assume C ∈ C&C ⊆ C′ ⊆ N . We distinguish two cases.
• First, suppose Y¬{v,w} is consistent. Then there exists a proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ U
n
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in which
— all i ∈ C accept all propositions in Y¬{w},
— all i ∈ C′\C accept all propositions in Y¬{v,w},
— all i ∈ N\C ′ accept all propositions in Y¬{v}.
F (A1, ..., An) contains v by C ∈ C and v ∈ V , and contains all y ∈ Y \{v,w} by
unanimity preservation. In summary, Y \{w} ⊆ F (A1, ..., An). So, by Y \{w} ⊢
¬w, ¬w ∈ F (A1, ..., An). Hence C′ ∈ C¬w, i.e., C′ ∈ C (by ¬w ∈ V ), as required.
• Second, suppose Y¬{v,w} is inconsistent. We consider a proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ U
n
in which
— all i ∈ C accept all propositions in Y¬{w},
— all i ∈ C′\C accept all propositions in Y¬(Y \{v,w}) (which is consistent by
(iv)),
— all i ∈ N\C accept all propositions in Y¬(Y \{w}) (which is consistent, again
by (iv)).
F (A1, ..., An) contains ¬w by C ∈ C and ¬w ∈ V , and contains all y ∈ Y \{v,w},
again by C ∈ C. In summary, Y¬{w}\{v} ⊆ F (A1, ..., An). So, as Y¬{w}\{v} ⊢ v
(by the case-B assumption), v ∈ F (A1, ..., An). Hence, C′ ∈ Cv, i.e., C′ ∈ C (by
v ∈ V ), as required.
By (vi) and (vii), C = {C ⊆ N : M ⊆ C} for M = ∩C∈CC, where M = ∅ by
unanimity preservation. So F is oligarchic with default W and set of oligarchs M ,
which completes the impossibility proof.
2. Conversely, suppose the agenda X is not semi-blocked or not even-number negat-
able.
Case 1: X is non-trivial. If X is not semi-blocked, then by Nehring (2006) there
exists a non-oligarchic aggregation rule satisfying all properties (and even monotonicity).
If X is semi-blocked, then by assumption it is not even-number negatable (hence totally
blocked by Lemma 1). So, the parity rule F : Un → P(X) among any odd-sized
subgroup M ⊆ N with |M | ≥ 3, deﬁned by F (A1, ..., An) = {p ∈ X : |{i ∈ M : p ∈
Ai}| is odd}, has all properties: it is obviously propositionwise, non-oligarchic and (by
oddness of |M |) unanimity-preserving, and it generates values in U, as ﬁrst shown by
Dokow and Holzman (2010a).15
Case 2: X is trivial. Deﬁne F : Un → P(X) as majority voting among a ﬁxed sub-
group M ⊆ N of odd size with |M | ≥ 3. F is obviously non-oligarchic, propositionwise
and unanimity-preserving. Finally, as all minimal inconsistent sets Y ⊆ X have size 2
by triviality, F generates sets in U, as the following classic argument shows. For any
(A1, ..., An) ∈ U
n, the set A := F (A1, ..., An) contains a member of each pair p,¬p ∈ X
(as M is odd). If A were inconsistent, it would have a minimal inconsistent subset
Y ⊆ A. We have |Y | = 2. So, as each p ∈ Y is majority-accepted within M and as two
majorities within M must overlap, some individual i ∈ M has Ai ⊆ Y , contradicting
Ai’s consistency. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3 on anonymous aggregation
Proof. Let n be even.
15More precisely, Dokow and Holzman show this not for even-number negatability but for an equivalent
(‘non-aﬃneness’) condition. For the proof with even-number negatability, see Dietrich (2007).
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First, suppose the agenda is blocked. For a contradiction, let F be an aggregation
rule with the required properties. By blockedness, there is a p ∈ X such that p ⊢⊢∗ ¬p
and ¬p ⊢⊢∗ p. By Lemma 2, Cp = C¬p; call this set C. As n is even, there is a C ⊆ N
with |C| = |N\C|. Consider a proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ Un in which p is accepted by all
i ∈ C and ¬p by all i ∈ N\C. Since by anonymity C ∈ C ⇔ N\C ∈ C, either both or
none of p,¬p are in F (A1, ..., An), a contradiction as F (A1, ..., An) ∈U.
Conversely, if the agenda is not blocked, there exists an aggregation rule with the
stated properties (and even with monotonicity), as shown by Nehring and Puppe (2002)
who construct a particular (asymmetric) unanimity rule, i.e., an oligarchy with maximal
set of oligarchs N . (The main part of their proof is to establish that there exists a
judgment set A ∈ U with at most one element in common with any minimal inconsistent
set Y ⊆ X; this set A serves as the default of the oligarchy.) 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4 on aggregation without individual veto power
and of the tightness claims about inequalities
Proof of Theorem 4. Parts of the argument are adapted from Nehring and Puppe’s
(2002) proof of their veto power result.16
1. First, suppose X is minimally blocked. For a contradiction, suppose F : Un →U
is propositionwise and without individual veto power. By minimal blockedness, there
are propositions p1, ..., pk, not all pairwise logically equivalent, such that p1 ⊢
∗ p2 ⊢
∗
... ⊢∗ pk ⊢
∗ p1. Among these conditional entailments there is one, say r ⊢
∗ s, that is not
an unconditional entailment, i.e., such that r ⊢ s (otherwise p1, ..., pk would be pairwise
logically equivalent). By r ⊢∗ s there is a Y ⊆ X such that Y ∪ {r,¬s} is inconsistent
but Y ∪ {r} and Y ∪ {¬s} are consistent. Hence each of Y ∪ {r, s} and Y ∪ {¬r,¬s}
is also consistent. By p1 ⊢
∗ p2 ⊢
∗ ... ⊢∗ pk ⊢
∗ p1 and Lemma 2, Cr = Cs. This set of
winning coalitions — call it C — need not be closed under taking supersets (as F need
not be monotonic), but it certainly contains all coalitions of size at least n− 1 as F is
without veto power. In particular, C is non-empty, hence contains a minimal member
C (with respect to set inclusion). By N\C ∈ C¬r and N ∈ C¬r we have C = ∅. So there
is an i ∈ C. Consider a proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈Un in which
• individual i accepts all propositions in {r,¬s} (a consistent set by r ⊢ s),
• all individuals in C\{i} accept all propositions in {r, s} ∪ Y ,
• all individuals in N\C accept all propositions in {¬r,¬s} ∪ Y .
Now F (A1, ..., An) contains r (as C ∈ C), each y ∈ Y (as coalitions of size at least
n − 1 are in C), but not s (as C\{i} ∈ C by C’s minimality). Hence, {r,¬s} ∪ Y ⊆
F (A1, ..., An), a contradiction as {r,¬s} ∪ Y is inconsistent.
2. Next, suppose n ≤ kX . We show that there is no propositionwise F : U
n → U
without individual veto power. For a contradiction, let F be such an aggregation rule.
Consider a minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X of maximal size. Then |Y | ≥ n, and so
Y has n pairwise distinct elements p1, ..., pn. By Y ’s minimal inconsistency, each set
Y¬{pi} is consistent, and hence there is a proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ U
n such that Y¬{pi} ⊆ Ai
for each i ∈ N . Now F (A1, ..., An) contains each p ∈ Y , since at least n− 1 individuals
accept p and F is without individual veto power. So F (A1, ..., An) is inconsistent, a
16 In particular, the aggregation rule constructed in case B of part 3 is a complicated variant of Nehring
and Puppe’s aggregation rule (which we could not have used here).
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contradiction.
3. Now suppose X is not minimally blocked and n ≥ 2K−1, where K := |X|/2. We
construct an aggregation rule with the required properties. We may assume without loss
of generality that X does not contain distinct but logically equivalent propositions.17
As X is not minimally blocked and no two propositions are logically equivalent, ⊢⊢∗ is
an anti-symmetric relation on X. As ⊢⊢∗ is also transitive, it is a partial order, hence
can be extended to a linear order ≤ on X that satisﬁes
(*) p ≤ q ⇔ ¬q ≤ ¬p for all p, q ∈ X,
by a standard type of argument (e.g., Duggan 1999): the set of partial orders ex-
tending ⊢⊢∗ and satisfying (*) is non-empty (it contains ⊢⊢∗) and closed under taking
the union of any chain, hence contains a maximal element ≤, which can be shown to
be complete, hence is a linear order. We partition X into the sets X< and X> contain-
ing the K lowest resp. K highest elements of X, and denote the members of X< by
p1, ..., pK in increasing order. We have
(**) p1 < ... < pK < ¬pK < ... < ¬p1 (hence X> = {¬p : p ∈ X<}),
as can easily be derived from (*).
We distinguish two cases, A and B.
Case A: X< is minimal inconsistent. We begin by proving a claim.
Claim A1. X< is the only minimal inconsistent subset of X other than the trivial
ones {p,¬p} ⊆ X.
Let Y be a non-trivial minimal inconsistent subset. First, we have |Y ∩X>| ≤ 1,
because if Y ∩X> had distinct members, say ¬pk,¬pl, then ¬pl < pk (by ¬pl ⊢
∗ pk)
but pk < ¬pl (as pk ∈ X< and ¬pl ∈ X>), a contradiction. In fact, Y ∩X> = ∅, by the
following argument. Suppose the contrary. Then Y ∩X> is a singleton, say {¬pk}. The
minimal inconsistent set Y does not equal {pk,¬pk} (by non-triviality of Y ), hence does
not contain pk, hence is a subset of (X<\{pk})∪{¬pk}, a contradiction since the latter
set is consistent (by X<’s minimal inconsistency). By Y ∩X> = ∅ we have Y ⊆ X<,
hence Y = X< as X< is (like Y ) minimal inconsistent. This completes the proof of
Claim A1.
Deﬁne a family of thresholds (mp)p∈X by
mp =

n− 1 if p ∈ X<
2 if p ∈ X>
and consider the aggregation rule F : Un → P(X) (a quota rule) given by
F (A1, ..., An) := {p ∈ X : |{i : p ∈ Ai}| ≥ mp}.
As F is obviously propositionwise and without individual veto power, it remains to
prove the following claim.
17To see why, suppose the existence proof is done for such agendas X, and now let X be arbitrary. Call
two proposition-negation pairs {p,¬p}, {q,¬q} ⊆ X equivalent if p is equivalent to q (hence ¬p to ¬q)
or p is equivalent to ¬q (hence ¬p to q). This deﬁnes an equivalence relation. Consider a (sub)agenda
X˜ ⊆ X that includes exactly one pair {p,¬p} from each equivalence class. Clearly, X˜ contains no
distinct but logically equivalent propositions, so that there exists an aggregation rule F˜ : U˜n → U˜ for
X˜ of the required form. F˜ induces an aggregation rule F : Un → U for X by identifying each A˜ ∈ U˜
with the unique A ∈ U satisfying A ⊇ A˜. As the reader can check, F inherits from F the required
properties, namely propositionwise independence and no individual veto power.
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Claim A2. F generates complete and consistent judgment sets.
Completeness holds because mp+m¬p ≤ n+1 for all p ∈ X (in fact, with equality).
Consistency is equivalent to the system of inequalities
y∈Y
my > n(|Y | − 1) for every minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X, (1)
by (the anonymous case of) Nehring and Puppe’s (2002) ‘intersection property’ result.18
By Claim A1, the system (1) reduces to the single inequality

p∈X<
(n−1) > n(K−1),
hence to K(n− 1) > n(K − 1), i.e., to n > K. If K ≤ 2 the latter holds because n ≥ 3.
If K ≥ 3 it holds by n ≥ 2K−1 > K. This completes the proof of Claim A2.
Case B : X< is not minimal inconsistent. Redeﬁne the family of thresholds (mp)p∈X
as
mpk =

n− 1 for k = 1
n− 2k−2 for all k ∈ {2, ...,K},
m¬pk = n+ 1−mpk for all k ∈ {1, ...,K},
which generates a quota rule F : Un → P(X) deﬁned by
F (A1, ..., An) = {p ∈ X : |{i : p ∈ Ai}| ≥ mp}.
As F is obviously propositionwise, the proof is completed by proving the following two
claims.
Claim B1. F is without individual veto power.
It obviously suﬃces to show that mp ≤ n− 1 for all p ∈ X. There are three kinds
of propositions to consider:
• For each k ∈ {1, ...,K}, obviously mpk ≤ n− 1.
• For each k ∈ {1, 2}, m¬pk = n+ 1−mpk = 2, which is at most n− 1 by n ≥ 3.
• For each k ∈ {3, ...,K}, m¬pk = n+ 1−mpk = 2
k−2 + 1, which is at most n− 1
because, by n ≥ 2K−1 ≥ 2k−1 ≥ 4, we have n−1 ≥ n/2+1 ≥ 2K−2+1 ≥ 2k−2+1.
This completes the proof of Claim B1.
Claim B2. F generates complete and consistent judgment sets.
As in the proof of Claim A2, completeness is equivalent to the system of inequalities
mp+m¬p ≤ n+1, p ∈ X, which is satisﬁed (with equality), and consistency is equivalent
to the system (1) (using the fact that by Claim B1 the thresholds (mp)p∈X belong to
{1, ..., n}, in fact to {2, ..., n−1}). Consider any minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X. There
are four cases.
• Let Y ⊆ X< = {p1, ...., pK} with p1 ∈ Y . Then
y∈Y
my = n|Y | −

pk∈Y
2k−2,
in which 
pk∈Y
2k−2 ≤
K
k=2
2k−2 = 2K−1 − 1 < 2K−1 ≤ n.
So,

y∈Y my > n(|Y | − 1).
18We use this result in the variant presented in Dietrich and List (2007e), valid for thresholds in the
grid {1, ..., n}.
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• Let Y ⊆ X< = {p1, ...., pK} with p1 ∈ Y . Then
y∈Y
my = mp1 +

pk∈Y \{p1}
mpk = (n− 1) + n(|Y | − 1)−

pk∈Y \{p1}
2k−2.
As Y = X< (by case-B assumption), we have Y  X<, hence Y \{p1}  {p2, ..., pK}.
So, as 2k−2 is increasing in k,

pk∈Y \{p1}
2k−2 ≤

pk∈{p3,...,pK}
2k−2 =
K
k=3
2k−2 = 2K−1 − 2 < n− 1.
Hence, again

y∈Y my > n(|Y | − 1).
• Let Y ∩X> = ∅ with p1 ∈ Y . We have |Y ∩X>| ≤ 1 by the argument in the proof
of Claim A1. Let ¬pl be the unique member of Y ∩X>. We also have Y ∩X< = ∅,
since otherwise Y = {¬pl}, which is impossible as Y is inconsistent and we have
excluded contradictions from the agenda. Further, Y \{¬pl} ⊆ {p2, ..., pl−1} (as
for each pk ∈ Y \{¬pl} we have pk ⊢
∗ pl, hence pk < pl, and so k < l). This
implies that l = 1 (as Y \{¬pl} = ∅), so that mpl = n − 2
l−2, and hence m¬pl =
n+ 1−mpl = 2
l−2 + 1. We have
y∈Y
my = m¬pl +

pk∈Y \{¬pl}
mpk = (2
l−2 + 1) + n(|Y | − 1)−

pk∈Y \{¬pl}
2k−2,
in which, by Y \{¬pl} ⊆ {p2, ..., pl−1},

pk∈Y \{¬pl}
2k−2 ≤
l−1
k=2
2k−2 = 2l−2 − 1 < 2l−2 + 1.
So, again

y∈Y my > n(|Y | − 1).
• Let Y ∩X> = ∅ with p1 ∈ Y . By arguments like in the previous case, one can
show that Y ∩X> has a unique member, say ¬pl, that Y \{¬pl} ⊆ {p1, ..., pl−1},
and that m¬pl = 2
l−2 + 1. So,
y∈Y
my = m¬pl +mp1 +

pk∈Y \{p1,¬pl}
mpk
= (2l−2 + 1) + (n− 1) + n(|Y | − 2)−

pk∈Y \{p1,¬pl}
2k−2
= 2l−2 + n(|Y | − 1)−

pk∈Y \{p1,¬pl}
2k−2,
in which, by Y \{p1,¬pl} ⊆ {p2, ..., pl−1},

pk∈Y \{p1,¬pl}
2k−2 ≤
l−1
k=2
2k−2 = 2l−2 − 1 < 2l−2.
So, again

y∈Y my > n(|Y | − 1). This completes the proof of Claim B2. 
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Proof that the bound kX in Theorem 4 is tight. Consider anyK ∈ {2, 3, ...}. We have
to specify an agenda X with kX = K such that for all n > K there is ‘possibility’. Let
X be an agenda X = {p1,¬p1, ..., pK ,¬pK} (containing K pairs) whose only minimal
inconsistent set (apart from the trivial ones {p,¬p} ⊆ X) is Y = {p1, ..., pK}. (Such
agendas exist of course, except in very ‘poor’ logics.) Obviously, kX = |Y | = K. Fix
a group size n > K. Deﬁne thresholds mp, p ∈ X, as n − 1 for p ∈ Y and as 2 for
p ∈ X\Y . The ‘quota rule’ F : Un → P(X) given by
F (A1, ..., An) = {p ∈ X : |{i : p ∈ Ai}| ≥ mp}
is trivially propositionwise and without individual veto power, and it generates outputs
in U by an argument analogous to that which shows Claim A2 in the proof of Theorem
4. 
Proof that the bound 2
|X|
2
−1 in Theorem 4 cannot be tightened to a bound without
exponential growth. We show that every sequence (bK)K=1,2,... in (0,∞) for which Theo-
rem 4 holds with ‘2|X|/2−1’ replaced by ‘b|X|/2’ grows exponentially (i.e., there is an a > 1
such that bK ≥ a
K for all suﬃciently large K). Let (bK)K=1,2,... be such a sequence; we
establish exponential growth by showing that bK > mK for all K, where (mk)k=1,2,...
denotes the Fibonacci sequence, which is deﬁned recursively by m1 = m2 = 1 and
mk = mk−1 +mk−2 for all k ≥ 3 and grows exponentially (with mk/mk−1 converging
to the golden mean).
Consider a ﬁxed K ∈ {1, 2, ...}. To (ultimately) show that bK > mK , we consider
an agenda X = {p1,¬p1, ..., pK ,¬pK} whose minimal inconsistent subsets (except the
trivial ones of type {pk,¬pk}) are precisely the sets Yk,l := {pk, pk+1,¬pl} with k, l ∈
{1, ...,K} and k+ 1 < l. Such an agenda does indeed exist, except in ‘poor’ languages,
as we should quickly convince ourselves of. For instance, suppose L is the language
of classical propositional logic with (at least) the connectives ¬,∨ and (at least) the
atomic propositions p1, ..., pK , and let L be endowed with the following consistency
notion (which enforces inconsistency of each set Yk,l): a set A ⊆ L is consistent if and
only if A ∪ {∨p∈Yk,l¬p : k, l ∈ {1, ...,K} and k + 1 < l} is classically consistent; in
other words, our consistency notion is classical consistency conditional on negating at
least one member from each set Yk,l. The sets Yk,l are precisely the non-trivial minimal
inconsistent subsets of X. To see why, note ﬁrst that each set Yk,l is obviously non-
trivial and minimal inconsistent. Conversely, suppose Y ⊆ X is non-trivial and minimal
inconsistent. Then for some k we have pk, pk+1 ∈ Y : otherwise Y would be consistent,
as we could extend Y to a (consistent and complete) set Y ∈ U by adding each ¬pj
for which Y contains none of pj ,¬pj. Let k be smallest such that pk, pk+1 ∈ Y . There
exists an l > k + 1 such that ¬pl ∈ Y : otherwise Y could be extended to a consistent
and complete set Y ∈ U by adding
• each ¬pj for which Y contains none of pj ,¬pj and j < k,
• each pj for which Y contains none of pj ,¬pj and j > k.
Note that Y ⊇ Yk,l, so that Y = Yk,l by minimal inconsistency.
The proof that bK > mK is completed by establishing the following two claims.
Claim 1. X is not minimally blocked.
Let ≤ be the linear order on X deﬁned by p1 < p2 < ... < pK < ¬pK < ... < ¬p1.
Check that, for any distinct p, q ∈ X, if p ⊢∗ q then p < q. So, as there is no <-cycle,
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there is no ⊢∗-cycle, as required.
Claim 2. If bK ≤ mK then for some group size n ≥ bK (namely for n = mK) there
is no propositionwise aggregation rule F : Un →U without individual veto power.
Let n = mK , and assume for a contradiction that F : U
n →U is a propositionwise
aggregation rule without individual veto power (it need not be monotonic or anony-
mous). For each integer h, let Ch be the set of coalitions C ⊆ N of size at least h. We
prove by induction that Cn−mk ⊆ Cpk for all k = 1, ...,K.
First, Cn−m1 = Cn−1 ⊆ Cp1 and C
n−m2 = Cn−1 ⊆ Cp2 , as F is without veto power.
Now let k ∈ {3, ...,K}, and suppose Cn−mk′ ⊆ Cpk′ whenever k
′ < k. Suppose for
a contradiction that Cn−mk ⊆ Cpk . Then there is a C ∈ C
n−mk such that C ∈ Cpk . So,
N\C ∈ C¬pk , and by |N\C| ≤ mk = mk−1+mk−2 we can partition N\C into coalitions
C1, C2 of sizes |C1| ≤ mk−1 and |C2| ≤ mk−2. Hence, N\C1 ∈ C
n−mk−1 and N\C2 ∈
Cn−mk−2 . So, by induction hypothesis, N\C1 ∈ Cpk−1 and N\C2 ∈ Cpk−2 . As C,C1, C2
form a partition of N and as {pk−2, pk−1,¬pk} = Yk,k+2 is minimal inconsistent, there
is a proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ U
n in which
• all i ∈ C have Ai ⊇ {pk−2, pk−1, pk}
• all i ∈ C1 have Ai ⊇ {pk−2,¬pk−1,¬pk}
• all i ∈ C2 have Ai ⊇ {¬pk−2, pk−1,¬pk}.
Then F (A1, ..., An) contains pk−2 by N\C2 ∈ Cpk−2 , pk−1 by N\C1 ∈ Cpk−1 and ¬pk
by N\C ∈ C¬pk , a contradiction as F (A1, ..., An) is consistent.
As n = mK , we have in particular C
0 ⊆ CpK . By C
0 = P(N) it follows that
CpK = P(N), whence C¬pK = ∅, a contradiction as F is without veto power. 
Inspection of the last proof shows that a tight lower bound on n for Theorem 4
would have to be intermediate in strength between the current bound ‘n ≥ 2
|X|
2
−1’ and
the weakest candidate ‘n > m|X|/2’ (where mK is the K
th Fibonacci number). Where
in this range the tight bound lies is left as an open question.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 5
To prove the result, we deﬁne a binary relation ∼ on X.
Deﬁnition 7 For any p, q ∈ X, write p ∼ q if there exists a ﬁnite sequence p1, ..., pk ∈
X with p1 = p and pk = q such that any neighbours pl, pl+1 are neither exclusive nor
exhaustive (i.e., {pl, pl+1} and {¬pl,¬pl+1} are consistent).
The following lemma summarizes the main properties of ∼. Call an agenda X
nested if it can be written as X = {p1,¬p1, ..., pK ,¬pK} such that pk ⊢ pk+1 for all
k ∈ {1, ...,K − 1}. Nestedness implies simplicity: as any two members of a nested
agenda X are (directly) logically dependent, there exist plenty of minimal inconsistent
sets Y ⊆ X but all of them have only size 2.
Lemma 4 ∼ deﬁnes an equivalence relation on X, with
• a single equivalence class if X is non-nested,
• exactly two equivalence classes, each of which contains one member of each pair
p,¬p ∈ X, if X is nested.
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Proof. These properties are shown in Dietrich and List (2007c), albeit in a semantic
framework with propositions represented as sets of possible worlds; we leave the simple
translation to the reader. 
An aggregation rule F is called systematic on Z (⊆ X) if, for all p, p′ ∈ Z and
all admissible proﬁles (A1, ..., An), (A
′
1, ..., A
′
n), [p ∈ Ai ⇔ p
′ ∈ A′i for all individuals i]
implies p ∈ F (A1, ..., An) ⇔ p
′ ∈ F (A′1, ..., A
′
n). For ‘systematic on X’ we simply say
‘systematic’.
Lemma 5 A propositionwise and extended-unanimity-preserving (for material implica-
tions) aggregation rule F : Un →U is systematic on each ∼-equivalence class.
Proof. Let F be as speciﬁed. As F is propositionwise, it suﬃces to show that Cp = Cq
for all p, q ∈ X such that p ∼ q. In fact, by a straightforward inductive argument it
suﬃces to show that Cp = Cq for all p, q ∈ X for which {p, q} and {¬p,¬q} are each
consistent.
Consider any such p, q ∈ X and any C ⊆ N ; we show that C ∈ Cp ⇔ C ∈ Cq. As
{p, q} and {¬p,¬q} are consistent, there exist judgment sets A1, ..., An ∈ U such that
p, q ∈ Ai for all i ∈ C and ¬p,¬q ∈ Ai for all i /∈ C.
We have p ∈ Ai ⇔ q ∈ Ai for all i, so that by applying extended unanimity preservation
(for material implications) in both directions we obtain
p ∈ F (A1, ..., An)⇔ q ∈ F (A1, ..., An).
NowC ∈ Cp is equivalent to p ∈ F (A1, ..., An), hence (as just shown) to q ∈ F (A1, ..., An),
and so to q ∈ Cq. 
Lemmas 4 and 5 imply the following global systematicity result.
Lemma 6 If the agenda is non-nested, every propositionwise and extended-unanimity-
preserving (for material implications) aggregation rule F : Un →U is systematic.
While the last systematicity result assumed just a non-nested agenda, the following
monotonicity result makes the stronger non-simplicity assumption.
Lemma 7 For a non-simple agenda, every propositionwise and extended-unanimity-
preserving (for material implications) aggregation rule F : Un →U is monotonic.
Proof. Let X and F be as speciﬁed. By Lemma 6, F is systematic. So Cp is the
same for all p ∈ X; call this set C. Let C ⊆ C ′ ⊆ N with C ∈ C; we have to show that
C′ ∈ C. AsX is non-simple, there exists a minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X with |Y | ≥ 3.
Choose pairwise distinct p, q, r ∈ Y . As each of Y¬{p}, Y¬{q}, Y¬{r} is consistent, there
are A1, ..., An ∈ U such that
• for all i ∈ C, Y¬{q} ⊆ Ai,
• for all i ∈ C′\C, Y¬{r} ⊆ Ai,
• for all i ∈ N\C ′, Y¬{p} ⊆ Ai.
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As ¬q ∈ Ai ⇒ p ∈ Ai for all i, we have ¬q ∈ F (A1, ..., An) ⇒ p ∈ F (A1, ..., An) by
extended unanimity preservation (for material implications). So, as ¬q ∈ F (A1, ..., An)
by C ∈ C, we have p ∈ F (A1, ..., An), and hence C
′ ∈ C (as F is propositionwise). 
Proof of Theorem 5. First, let X be non-simple. For a contradiction suppose F
is an an aggregation rule with all required properties. By X’s non-nestedness and the
last two lemmas, F is systematic and monotonic. Hence F is dictatorial by a standard
result for non-simple agendas (Nehring and Puppe 2002), a contradiction.
Conversely, let X be simple. As n ≥ 3, there exists an odd-sized non-singleton
subgroup M ⊆ N . The aggregation rule F : Un → P(X) deﬁned as majority voting
among the members of M is extended-unanimity-preserving (for material implications)
(as one can verify), non-dictatorial (by |M | > 1) and of course propositionwise, and it
generates judgment sets in U (as |M | is odd and X is simple; see the argument in case
2 of part 2 of the proof of Theorem 2). 
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